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inations is the distinction between rigidity and direct reference,
an issue deeply connected to the representation of the behaviour
of two operators: ‘dthat’ and ‘actually’. Diﬀerences between the
mode of operation of ‘dthat’ and ‘actually’ have been observed,
but they have not been examined in depth. Our purpose is to
explore systematically to what extent the observed diﬀerences be-
tween the two operators have truth conditional consequences that
are formally representable in possible worlds semantics.
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1 Possible worlds semantics
Semantics is often characterized as a theory of truth conditions. Diﬀerences in
meaning between two expressions are never as clearly demonstrated as when
it is possible to point out diﬀerences in the truth conditions of the sentences
in which the expressions in question figure and, in spite of the emergence of
other systems and approaches, possible worlds semantics continues to be the
most powerful tool of formal representation in semantics, aﬀording a precise
characterization of the truth conditions of sentences as intensions, i.e., func-
tions from possible worlds to truth values. In general, the representation of
meanings in terms of functions from possible worlds to the appropriate kind
of extensions delivers a compositional semantics that formally captures the
semantic operation of non-syncategorematic expressions in an ordinary lan-
guage.
Although possible worlds semantics is clearly a powerful tool to represent
faithfully the semantic properties of natural language sentences, it has been
often argued that it is too coarse. There are important properties of sentences
that are not discriminated in possible worlds semantics. One interesting case
that raises questions about the ability of possible worlds semantics to make
the appropriate discriminations is the distinction between rigidity and direct
reference, an issue deeply connected to the representation of the behaviour of
two operators: ‘dthat’ and ‘actually’. Some diﬀerences between the mode of
operation of ‘dthat’ and ‘actually’ have been pointed out by several authors.1
Our purpose here is to explore formally how diﬀerent these operators really
are and to what extent the observed diﬀerences do have truth conditional con-
sequences representable in possible world semantics.
2 Rigidity and direct reference
Kripke’s notion of rigidity, a notion that underpins one of the most important
revolutions in semantic theory, was presented within the framework of possible
worlds semantics: a rigid designator designates the same object in every possi-
ble world. Hence, ‘the successor of 7’ is rigid because it designates the number
8 in every possible world, whereas ‘the tutor of Alexander the Great’ is not
1Most notably by (Salmon 1991). See also (Soames 2005, 28-30) for a summary.
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rigid, since someone diﬀerent from Aristotle could have tutored Alexander.2
Kripke’s revolutionary claim was that names are rigid designators, whereas
most definite descriptions, in particular the descriptions that were associated
with names according to classical descriptivists, are not.
It has been typically assumed that a rigid designator designates nothing
in a world in which the actual designatum fails to exist, following (Kripke
1971, 146) and (Kripke 1980, 49): “a designator rigidly designates a certain
object if it designates that object wherever the object exists.” But this has
been the source of some controversy and even Kripke has suggested that some
rigid designators, names in particular, designate even in worlds in which the
designatum fails to exist (see (Kaplan 1989, 570, fn. 8), suggesting that names
are not just rigid but obstinately rigid.3 This is an important issue, and we
will return to it.
A non-rigid designator can be rigidified using the intensional operator ‘ac-
tually’ or ‘actual’. ‘Actually’ operates on formulas: the interpretation of ac-
tually ϕ at any possible world is the interpretation of ϕ at the actual world.
When combined with definite descriptions, the x : actually Px (or, closer to
natural language, the actual P ) designates i in every possible world in which i
exists, if the x : Px designates i in the actual world. For instance, ‘the actual
tutor of Alexander the Great’ designates Aristotle in every world w in which
Aristotle exists, for Aristotle is the individual in w that satisfies being tutor
of Alexander in the actual world.
Direct reference, a diﬀerent revolutionary idea introduced by Kaplan, ap-
peared on the scene roughly around the time Kripke introduced his distinction
between rigid and non-rigid designators. Unlike rigidity, direct reference relies
on the Russellian picture of structured propositions. A term is directly refer-
ential just in case it contributes its referent to the proposition expressed by
sentences containing it. Propositions are represented by Kaplan as n-tuples
that contain the elements contributed to truth-conditional content by expres-
sions in sentences. Hence, in (Kaplan 1978) we learn that the truth-conditional
content, or proposition expressed by a sentence of the form n is Q, where n
is directly referential, is singular, a proposition of the form < i,Q∗ >, where
i is the referent of n and Q∗ is the property expressed by the predicate Q.
In contrast, the propositional contribution of a non-directly referential term,
2This, of course, takes for granted that teaching Alexander was not an essential property of Aristotle, a
plausible assumption.
3See (LaPorte 2018, section 1.2).
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a definite description such as the P , is general, an attributive complex that
selects at each index of evaluation w the individual relevant for the compu-
tation of truth value at w. Hence, the P is Q expresses a proposition that
can be represented as << ‘the’, P ∗ >,Q∗ >. The diﬀerence between singu-
lar propositions, those expressed by sentences containing directly referential
terms, and general propositions can be best captured as a diﬀerence between
the constituents of truth conditional content: in the case of a singular propo-
sition, a proposition of the form < i,Q∗ >, it is i itself that determines truth
value at each index of evaluation, whereas in the case of a general proposition,
a proposition of the form << ‘the’, P ∗ >,Q∗ > an attributive complex (con-
strained by a condition of uniqueness) selects for each index the individual
that will determine truth value at that index. Even if the attributive com-
plex < ‘the’, P ∗ > selects i at each index, the truth conditional content, i.e.,
that which determines truth conditions, is diﬀerent in each case. Or, in other
words, even if the P is a rigid definite description that designates i, the items
determining truth conditions that correspond to the P and to n are quite
diﬀerent.
Names, indexicals and demonstratives are, according to Kaplan, paradig-
matic instances of directly referential terms. But Kaplan also introduces a
device that operates on definite descriptions and produces directly referential
terms: the ‘dthat’ operator. The idea behind the mode of operation of ‘dthat’
can be captured if one thinks of a definite description as a demonstration, like
a pointing. When a speaker ostensibly points at a person i and utters ‘that
P is Q’, i becomes the truth conditional content of the sentence uttered. In a
similar vein, if the P designates i, dthat(the P ) contributes i, not the complex
< ‘the’, P ∗ > to the truth conditional content. Observe, however, that the
contribution of the actual P to content, to put it in Kaplanian terms, is not
i, but rather an attributive complex corresponding to the actual P . Hence,
the mode of operation of ‘dthat’ is quite diﬀerent from the mode of opera-
tion of ‘actual’ or ‘actually’. But the important question for our purposes is
whether that diﬀerence generates a diﬀerence in possible-world-representable
truth conditions.
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3 The semantic operation of ‘actually’ and
‘dthat’
The combination of the actuality operator (A) with definite descriptions
raises an interesting issue as regards the index at which the requirement of
uniqueness should be satisfied. We have two prima facie plausible choices: the
world of evaluation, or the actual world. Let w be a possible world, D(w)
the domain of individuals existing at w, @ the actual world and Int(ϕ)w the
interpretation of an expression ϕ at w.4 The choices can be represented as
follows:
(a) Int(the x : APx)w = i if i ∈ D(w) and i is the unique individual in
D(w) that satisfies Px in @. Int(the x : APx)w is undefined otherwise.
(b) Int(the x : APx)w = i if i ∈ D(w) and i is the unique individual in
D(@) that satisfies Px in @. Int(the x : APx)w is undefined otherwise.
If we put it in Russellian terms, the question is which one of these two
sentences (corresponding to (a) and (b)) best captures the logical form of the
actual P is Q, a diﬀerence that hinges on whether the uniqueness condition
falls under the scope of ‘actually’:
(a’) ∃x[APx ∧ ∀y(APy → x = y) ∧Qx]
(b’) ∃x[A(Px ∧ ∀y(Py → x = y)) ∧Qx]
In (a’) we are treating actually P as a predicate: there is an i in w such
that i is actually P and anything in w that is actually P is that very i (and i
is Q).
In (b’) the condition of uniquely satisfying P is meant to be satisfied in
the actual world: there is an i in w such that actually i is the only P (and i
is Q).
Both are possible interpretations, and many informal discussions of the
role of rigidified definite descriptions fail to distinguish between the two. This
is because, typically, illustrations of the behavior of ‘actual’ use definite de-
scriptions such as ‘the actual President of the US’ a description that designates
Trump in a world w in which both Trump and Clinton exist and Clinton wins
the 2016 election. Since there is only one President of the US in @ and, by
assumption, also in w, the question as regards the locus of satisfaction of the
uniqueness requirement is not addressed.
4The interpretation funtion Int is defined relative to a structure, an index of evaluation and an assignment,
but we are abbreviating the technical details, which are trivial.
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In our view, there is a clear motivation to go for (a/a’) rather than (b/b’).
Consider the term ‘the only actually existing person’. In a world in which Pat
is the only one of the actual human beings that exists, surrounded by human
possibilia, it should be true that Pat is the only actually existing human being
and hence that ‘the only actually existing person’ designates her relative to
that world.
Yet, Pat will not uniquely satisfy Exists x in @, and so the description
in question will be denotationless in w if (b) is the interpretation of choice.
Or, if (b’) is the chosen representation, any sentence in which the description
figures will be false:
∃x[A(Exists x ∧ ∀y(Exists y → x = y)) ∧Qx]
for the uniqueness condition under the scope of the operator A will not be
satisfied if there are in the actual world at least two people.5
Hence, we will take (a) and (a’) to be the correct choices for the interpre-
tation of sentences in which descriptions of the form the actual P occur.6
On the other hand, the interpretation of dthat(the P ) is given by the fol-
lowing clause:
Int(dthat(the P ))w = i if i ∈ D(@) and i is the unique individual in D(@)
that satisfies Px in @. Int(dthat(the P ))w is undefined otherwise.
We can try to capture the logical form of sentences containing the operator
‘dthat’ in terms of quantifiers, taking inspiration from Russell. For a sentence
such as dthat(the P ) is Q, the formalizations (a’) or (b’) will not do. When
we evaluate dthat(the P ) is Q in any world w, we need to select an individual
in the domain of the actual world, and the existential quantifier, both in (a’)
and (b’), search for individuals in w. Adding an actuality operator in front of
the existential quantifier in (a’) or (b’) will not do, since then the truth of the
sentence will depend on whether the individual in @ which is uniquely P in
@ is Q in @, and what we really need is an individual which is uniquely P in
@ and Q in w. Hence we need to be able to quantify over the domain of the
actual world even when we are evaluating in a diﬀerent world w.
The actuality quantifiers (∀@, ∃@), introduced by Allen Hazen (1990), are
5Of course, given that we identify the domain of a world with what exists at that world, that formula is
just equivalent to ∃x[A∀y(x = y) ∧Qx].
6(Soames 2005, 30, fn. 22), reporting a suggestion by Ali Kazmi, proposes that what we have called (b) is
a “highly intuitive reading [of sentences of the form the actual P is Q] in which the uniqueness condition is
correctly imposed on things that have the property expressed by [P ] in the world-state of the context [namely,
the actual world]”. Soames gives no indication why he regards this reading as highly intuitive but, as we think
our example involving ‘the actually existing person’ shows, that reading is not adequate.
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designed precisely to do that.7 In general,
Int(∀@xϕ(x))w = true iﬀ for all i ∈ D(@), Int(ϕ(x)[i/x])w = true (analo-
gously for ∃@).
With the help of those quantifiers, we can represent the sentence dthat(the P )
is Q as:
(a*) ∃@x[APx ∧ ∀@y(APy → x = y) ∧Qx]
We could also use a formalization similar to (b’), namely
(b*) ∃@x[A(Px ∧ ∀@y(Py → x = y)) ∧Qx],
but in this case (a*) and (b*) are equivalent. The diﬀerence between (a’)
and (b’) had to do with the locus of satisfaction of the uniqueness condition.
In the case of ‘dthat’ the uniqueness condition has to be satisfied in the ac-
tual world, otherwise dthat(the P ) is denotationless with respect to all indices.
(b*) explicitly captures that condition by including the uniqueness condition
under the scope of @. But (a*) achieves the same result, by restricting the
domain of the universal quantifier to the actual world.
4 A merely conceptual diﬀerence between
‘dthat’ and ‘actually’?
Clearly there is an important conceptual diﬀerence between ‘dthat’ and the
‘actually’ operator. Resorting again to the picture of structured proposi-
tions, whereas dthat(the P ) is Q expresses a singular proposition of the form
< i,Q∗ >, the actual P is Q expresses a general proposition of the form
<< ‘the’, Actual P∗ >,Q∗ > or, in other words, whereas in the case of
dthat(the P ) is Q, i is the object that is provided as the determiner of truth
value at each index, in the case of the actual P is Q an attributive complex
selects, among the individuals in the domain of any given world w, the unique
individual that happens to be P in the actual world.
To give an example, let us suppose for the moment that Aristotle exists
in all worlds: ‘the actual tutor of Alexander the Great was a philosopher’
7Hazen actuality quantifiers should not be confused with the ordinary quantifiers (usually misnomed ‘actu-
alist quantifiers’, in order to distinguish them from possibilist quantifiers). As Hazen notes, ordinary quantifiers
are really world-restricted, since they always range over the domain of evaluation. Hazen’s aim is diﬀerent
from ours: he shows that the actuality quantifiers and the operator ‘actually’ both expand the expressive
power of first-order logic, and he also shows that both devices are not equivalent. Moreover, Hazen’s language
does not incorporate definite descriptions.
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expresses a general proposition whose truth value at an index w depends on
whether the unique individual in the domain of w that happens to be actually
tutor of Alexander (namely, Aristotle) is a philosopher in w. ‘Dthat (the tutor
of Alexander the Great) was a philosopher’, on the other hand, expresses a
singular proposition whose truth value at each index depends on whether
Aristotle is a philosopher at that index.
This is all well, and one can see that, conceptually, there is an important
diﬀerence here in how the truth conditions of the respective sentences are
captured and in how truth value at an index is determined. But the diﬀerence
aﬀects the how not the what. Direct reference proponents may insist on the
importance of the distinction between the two kinds of content, but the fact is
that no truth conditional diﬀerence between the two sentences is manifested:
the functions from possible worlds to truth values that represent their truth
conditions are the same. As (Soames 2005, 28n.) puts it, “this diﬀerence
between dthat-rigidified descriptions and actually-rigidified descriptions [. . .]
all but washes away in semantic systems in which the content of an expression
in a context is identified with its intension.”
That there is no truth conditional diﬀerence between ‘dthat (the tutor of
Alexander the Great) was a philosopher’ and ‘the actual tutor of Alexan-
der the Great was a philosopher’, if domains are not allowed to vary, is
clear. If domains do vary, interesting issues arise if we consider a world
w in which Aristotle fails to exist, for decisions have to be made as re-
gards the assignment of truth value to each of those sentences in w: false,
or indeterminate. In a world in which Aristotle does not exist, he obvi-
ously is not a philosopher, so < Aristotle, Philosopher∗ > can arguably
be said to be false. On the other hand, in that very world Aristotle is not
a member of the antiextension of the predicate ‘philosopher’ and the sen-
tence can be considered to be indeterminate on the grounds that Aristotle
is not in the range of applicability of ‘philosopher’. And the same goes for
<< ‘the’,Actual tutor of Alexander the Great∗ >, Philosopher∗ >, for there
is no individual in w that can be selected by the attributive complex. No
matter which way we decide to go, it is natural to think that the two sen-
tences should suﬀer the same fate. True, it may be argued that the reasoning
behind the assignment of falsity or indeterminacy is diﬀerent for the two sen-
tences. Sure enough, and very interesting, but let us recall that possible worlds
semantics is blind to the reasoning and the narratives behind the results: dif-
ferences in semantic mode of operation are intangible if they do not show up
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as diﬀerences in truth conditions.
However, if we think now in Russellian terms, the sentence ‘the actual
tutor of Alexander the Great was a philosopher’ is false, because the claim of
existence is false. But as regards ‘dthat (the tutor of Alexander the Great)
was a philosopher’, there is still a choice between false and indeterminate.
So if we endorse the indeterminacy of the latter, there is a truth conditional
diﬀerence between ‘dthat’ and ‘actually’.
5 Attributions of existence
Arguably, a truth conditional diﬀerence between sentences containing a stan-
dard rigid designator and sentences containing an obstinate rigid designator
shows up in attributions of existence. Recall that an obstinately rigid desig-
nator refers even in worlds in which its designatum fails to exist, whereas a
standard rigid designator (or a persistent designator, in Salmon’s terminology)
does not designate anything in worlds in which its designatum fails to exist.8
‘Dthat’, arguably, operates as an obstinate rigidifier, since the designatum of
dthat(the P ) is the object relevant for the evaluation of sentences in which
dthat(the P ) figures, independently of whether that designatum exists or does
not exist at a given index. The actual P , on the other hand, is a standard
rigid designator. As Scott Soames has noted:
A dthat-rigidified description, dthat[the x : Fx], which designates
an object o in the world-state of the context [the actual world],
designates o in all world-states, even those in which o does not
exist. By contrast, [. . .] the x : actually Fx will fail to designate
anything at a world-state in which o does not exist. (Soames 2005,
28-29)
Focusing now on attributions of existence, if r is a standard rigid designa-
tor, there is a choice as to how sentences of the form r exists are evaluated
in worlds in which r does not denote. The sentences may be considered false
(which appears to be the more natural choice) or they can be interpreted as
indeterminate if we abide by the general principle that sentences with deno-
tationless terms are indeterminate. But if r is obstinately rigid, there is no
8See (Salmon 1991, 34) for the definition of obstinacy and persistence.
Organon F 26 (3) 2019: 491–504
500 Genoveva Martí and José Martínez-Fernández
choice; r designates even in worlds in which its designatum fails to exist, and
there is no question that in such worlds r exists is false.9
The diﬀerence observed between obstinate rigid designators and standard
rigid designators as regards attributions of existence should be expected to
occur in the presence of ‘dthat’ and of ‘actually: ‘dthat (the tutor of Alexander
the Great)’ and ‘the actual tutor of Alexander the Great’ both designate
Aristotle in the actual world. But in a world w in which Aristotle does not
exist, ‘dthat (the tutor of Alexander the Great) exists’ would be assigned the
truth value False, the same truth value that corresponds to ‘Aristotle exists’,
for those sentences express a complete and evaluable singular proposition <
Aristotle, Exists∗ >. But in such a world, the actualized description fails to
denote, and the sentence ‘the actual tutor of Alexander the Great exists’ can
be evaluated as indeterminate or as false. So, a truth conditional diﬀerence
between sentences of the form the actual P is Q and sentences of the form
dthat(the P ) is Q may manifest itself.
Observe, however, that the case for a truth-conditional diﬀerence depends
on accepting a specific policy on the treatment of sentences with denotation-
less terms. And it depends also on accepting ‘exists’ as a predicate in the
language, a controversial choice that some may find objectionable. If we re-
ject the predicative status of ‘exists’ and paraphrase its ocurrences in favor of
quantification, the sentence ‘the actual tutor of Alexander the Great exists’
will be as false in w as ‘dthat (the tutor of Alexander the Great) exists’, since
any representation of the logical form of ‘the actual tutor of Alexander the
Great exists’ will start with an existential quantifier ranging over the domain
of w, and no individual in w is actually tutor of Alexander. So, even in the
case of attributions of existence, it is doubtful that the two operators generate
sentences that diﬀer in truth value across possible worlds. In fact, this is not a
phenomenon that arises because of the use of ‘dthat’ and ‘actually’. Compare
‘Aristotle exists’ with ‘the oﬀspring of gametes X and Y exists.’ Let us say
that the description ‘the oﬀspring of gametes X and Y’ refers rigidly to Aristo-
tle. Whereas the name is obstinately rigid, the description is only standardly
rigid, however, the formulas ∃xx = Aristotle and ∃x[Ox ∧ ∀y(Oy → x = y)]
are both false in a world in which Aristotle does not exist. So the phenomenon
just observed generalizes to all obstinate and all standard rigid designators.
Attributions of existence do not conclusively provide a way of discriminat-
9See also (Gómez-Torrente 2006, 250-251), and (Besson 2009, sect. 2.4), for related discussions on attri-
butions of existence.
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ing between obstinately and standardly rigid designators and, in particular,
between ‘dthat’ and ‘actually’. There is, however, a truth conditional diﬀer-
ence generated by the two operators, one that has not been so widely discussed,
and that it is easy to capture without relying on dubious commitments.
6 A truth-conditional diﬀerence
Let us consider the following case: in the actual world @ there are many
people that smoke. A description such as ‘the smoker’ is improper and fails
to denote. Suppose now that w is a world in which only one of the actual
smokers, let us call him a, exists. a may be or may not be a smoker in w.
But in w ‘the actual smoker’ designates a, for a is the unique individual in
the domain of w that satisfies the open formula actual smoker(x), in virtue of
satisfying smoker(x) in @. Hence ‘the actual smoker’ fails to denote in @, but
it does acquire a denotation in w, for in w there is after all a unique individual
in the domain that is selected by the attributive complex ‘actual smoker’: in
w, a is an actual smoker.10 Resorting to the picture of propositions used by
Kaplan, we can say that the proposition expressed by ‘the actual smoker is
a man’, the general proposition << ‘the’, Actual Smoker∗ > ,Man∗ >, will
be false or indeterminate in @, but will be true in w.
‘Dthat (the smoker)’, on the other hand, does not designate anybody in
@ either, for the description it employs fails, like an ambiguous pointing, to
demonstrate a unique individual. But unlike ‘the actual smoker’, ‘dthat (the
smoker)’ will not acquire a denotation in w. The role of the operator ‘dthat’
applied to a definite description is to provide the individual designated by the
definite description as the element that figures in the computation of truth
value at all indices of evaluation. In the case of ‘dthat (the smoker)’ we are
missing that element, so the computation of truth value at w does not even
get oﬀ the ground.
10(Soames 2005, 29), crediting Ali Kazmi, mentions the peculiar behaviour of expressions of the form the
actual P when they are improper in the actual world, since they may acquire diﬀerent denotations in diﬀerent
worlds. Soames’ concerns have to do with how this peculiar behaviour aﬀects the status of ‘actually’ as a
rigidifier. Here we are focusing rather on how the truth-conditional behaviour of ‘actually’ can be shown to
be diﬀerent from the truth-conditional behaviour of ‘dthat’. It is worth noticing that it is in order to avoid the
eﬀects of this peculiar behavior that Soames proposes (Soames 2005, fn. 22) an interpretation of the actual P
is Q that imposes the satisfaction of the condition of uniqueness in the actual world. It is attractive to do so,
since in the conditions envisaged ‘the actual smoker’ would not designate in w because it would not designate
in @. But, as we have argued (see section 3, and in particular fn. 6), we think that the interpretation Soames
suggests is not correct.
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Resorting again to the apparatus of structured propositions we can say
that since ‘dthat (the smoker)’ fails to designate in the actual world, there is
no propositional constituent provided. The proposition expressed by ‘dthat
(the smoker) is a man’ should be a proposition of the form < i,Man∗ >, a
singular proposition with an object in the subject position, an object whose
role is to intervene in the computation of truth value in @ and in other indices.
But there is no such object. We might say that ‘dthat (the smoker) is a man’
does not express a proposition. Or, following a lead by Kaplan,11 we may say
that it expresses a gappy proposition, one that can be evaluated as false or
as indeterminate, in @ and also in w. But surely, the proposition in question
will not be true in w.
Hence, this case suggests that the two operators can have diﬀerent truth
conditional impact. A more precise representation of the semantics of the two
sentences discussed will further clarify the details. Following the strategy of
section 3, we will first focus on a language that contains a descriptor and the
operators ‘dthat’ and ‘actually’. We will then focus on a language in which
the descriptor and the operator ‘dthat’ are eliminated in favor of ordinary and
Hazen’s actuality quantifiers.
Let us consider a standard first-order language with identity, a descriptor
operator ‘ι’, the modal operator of actuality ‘A’ and the operator ‘dthat’.
Given a variable x, a term t and a formula ϕ, ιxϕ is a term, Aϕ is a formula
and dthat(t) is a term. As usual, we will consider the language interpreted on
a structure consisting of a set of possible worldsW containing the actual world
@, a domain of individuals D(w) for each world w ∈ W and interpretations
for constants and predicates.12 Clauses for interpretation are the usual ones,
with the new operators interpreted as:
Int(ιxϕ)w = i iﬀ i is the unique individual in D(w) such that i satisfies ϕ
in w; otherwise, Int(ιxϕ)w is undefined.
Int(Aϕ)w = Int(ϕ)@
Int(dthat(t))w = Int(t)@
In this language, ‘the actual smoker is a man’ will be formalized asM(ιxASx)
and ‘dthat (the smoker) is a man’ as M(dthat(ιxSx)). To see the diﬀerence
in truth conditions, let us consider the following structure < W,D, Int > :
W = {@, w}
11See (Kaplan 1989, 496, fn. 23).
12Nothing depends on the specific modal logic, so we will not represent the relation of accessibility between
worlds. As above, we will also disregard the assignment function.
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D(@) = {0, 1}
D(w) = {0, 2}
Int(S)@ = {0, 1} Int(S)w = {2}
Int(M)@ = {1} Int(M)w = {0}
ιxASx does not denote in @, because in D(@) there are two smokers,
and ιxASx denotes 0 in w, because 0 is the unique actual smoker in D(w).
Therefore, the sentence M(ιxASx) is either false or undetermined (we leave
that unspecified) in @, but it is true in w.
By the semantic clause for ‘dthat’:
Int(dthat(ιxSx))w = Int(ιxSx)@ = i if i is the unique individual in D(@)
that satisfies Sx in @, and it is undefined otherwise.
It is crucial that in this semantic analysis the relativity to the domain of
the world of evaluation disappears, so dthat(ιxSx) denotes neither in @ nor in
w, and the sentence M(dthat(ιxSx)) is either false or undetermined in both
worlds. We see then that there is a diﬀerence in truth value status in the
world w.
Let us now consider a language in which ‘dthat’ and the descriptor have
been eliminated. In this case the sentences ‘the actual smoker is a man’ and
‘dthat (the smoker) is a man’ will be translated using our previous formaliza-
tions (a’) and (a*):
∃x[ASx ∧ ∀y(ASy → x = y) ∧Mx]
∃@x[ASx ∧ ∀@y(ASy → x = y) ∧Mx]
And following the argument of section 3 it is obvious that the first sentence
is true and the second is false at the index of evaluation w.
In order to highlight the special status of this case, let us now consider a
diﬀerent structure with the same constituents as before, with the exception of
the interpretation of the predicate S, which is replaced by the following one:
Int(S)@ = {1} Int(S)w = {2}
Now dthat(ιxSx) denotes 1 in @ and the sentence M(dthat(ιxSx)) is true
in @. In w, dthat(ιxSx) still denotes 1, but since 1 is not a member of the
domain D(w), the truth value of M(dthat(ιxSx)) depends on decisions about
the truth value of sentences in which a term denotes an object that fails to
exist in the world in question. As it was the case in the previous structure,
the description ιxASx designates 1 in @, but now it fails to designate in w,
making the sentence M(ιxASx) true in @ and either false or undetermined
in w, depending on general policies about the truth-value status of sentences
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with denotationless terms.13
If our policy on how to treat sentences with denotationless terms diﬀers
from our policy as regards how to treat sentences in which the denotation of a
term fails to exist, then in w we would assign false to one of the sentences and
undetermined to the other. A truth conditional diﬀerence is revealed in this
case, but that diﬀerence only shows up because of decisions about semantic
phenomena unrelated to the semantic behavior of the operators in question.
By contrast, in the first structure, the truth conditional diﬀerence is inde-
pendent of those policies. That, we submit, unmistakably establishes that
possible worlds semantics can distinguish between the two operators.14
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